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In the study of nonconscious processing, different methods have been used in order to
render stimuli invisible. While their properties are well described, the level at which they
disrupt nonconscious processing remains unclear. Yet, such accurate estimation of the
depth of nonconscious processes is crucial for a clear differentiation between conscious
and nonconscious cognition. Here, we compared the processing of facial expressions ren-
dered invisible through gaze-contingent crowding (GCC), masking, and continuous ﬂash
suppression (CFS), three techniques relying on different properties of the visual system.
We found that both pictures and videos of happy faces suppressed from awareness by
GCC were processed such as to bias subsequent preference judgments.The same stimuli
manipulated with visual masking and CFS did not bias signiﬁcantly preference judgments,
although they were processed such as to elicit perceptual priming. A signiﬁcant difference
in preference bias was found between GCC and CFS, but not between GCC and mask-
ing. These results provide new insights regarding the nonconscious impact of emotional
features, and highlight the need for rigorous comparisons between the different methods
employed to prevent perceptual awareness.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 20 years, it has been clearly established that stimuli
that are inaccessible to conscious reports can still inducebehavioral
and neural responses (Marcel, 1983; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007).
As nonconscious inﬂuences are usually of small amplitude, their
measurement requires a sensory stimulation of maximumpossible
energy satisfying the criterion of invisibility. To ensure speciﬁcity,
they must be associated with a strict control of stimulus visibil-
ity to avoid potential confounds with conscious inﬂuences. So far,
in order to prevent conscious processing, researchers have relied
often on two kinds of manipulations, namely visual masking and
continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS; see Kim and Blake, 2005, for
other techniques relying notably on attentional manipulations).
In visual backward masking, a short-lasting stimulus (i.e., below
50ms) is immediately followed by a visual pattern (i.e., the mask),
and becomes impossible to detect or discriminate (Breitmeyer and
Ög˘men, 2006). In CFS, a stimulus of interest, is presented to one
eye while a dynamic stream of salient patterns is presented to the
other eye. Due to binocular rivalry, the stimulus is suppressed
and remains undetectable even after exposure of several seconds
(Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005).
These two approaches have been extremely fruitful to describe
the depth of nonconscious cognition (see Kouider and Dehaene,
2007 for a review on visual masking, and Lin and He, 2009 for a
review on binocular rivalry). Surprisingly, very few studies com-
pared systematically the fate of stimuli suppressed from awareness
by visual masking and CFS (Almeida et al., 2008; Kanai et al.,
2010). Such methodological comparisons are of crucial impor-
tance in the context of a contrastive research on consciousness
(Baars, 1997). Indeed, if one tries to characterize the differences
between conscious and nonconscious processing, one has to make
sure that these differences are indeed genuine, and do not stem
from methodological limitations. As these limitations might be
intrinsic to all experimental paradigms, we propose as a heuristic
to compare systematically different methods, and disentangle the
limits attributed to nonconscious cognition and the limits attrib-
uted to the method. Accordingly, this study sets to compare the
level of nonconscious processing obtained with visual masking,
CFS, and a third, recent alternative involving visual crowding.
In visual crowding, a peripheral stimulus appears jumbled and
becomes undiscriminable when surrounded by similar ﬂankers.
By contrast to both masking and CFS, the detection of a crowded
stimulus is preserved, since observers are able to report its pres-
ence. Nonetheless, properties of the crowded stimulus which are
shared with the ﬂankers cannot be discriminated. In order to
control for stimulus discriminability, we implemented crowding
in conjunction with eye-tracking control, resulting in a method
we called gaze-contingent crowding (GCC; Faivre and Kouider,
2011a; Kouider et al., 2011). GCC allows for the substitution of
the crowded stimulus with an irrelevant content as soon as the
observer’s gaze diverges from a deﬁned location. Interestingly,
since increasing the duration of a crowded stimulus does not
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restore discriminability (Kooi et al., 1994), GCC allows for a con-
tinuous, long-lasting stimulation (i.e., high energy) with a reliable
control of stimulus discriminability (i.e., avoiding potential con-
foundswith conscious inﬂuences). Several studies have established
the existence of a dissociation between the subjective feeling of a
crowded, uninformative percept, and the underlying processing
occurring without awareness, both at the level of single features
(e.g., line orientation, see He et al., 1996), and multiple features
(e.g., facial identity, directional arrow, Faivre and Kouider, 2011a).
Recently, we found that peripheral faces whose emotional fea-
tures were crowded by ﬂanking patterns were processed such as
to bias subsequent preference judgments (Kouider et al., 2011).
Indeed, participants rated abstract targets (i.e., unknown Chi-
nese pictographs) as more pleasant when previously exposed to
happy compared to angry crowded faces. Notably, a similar pref-
erence bias was elicited by dynamic (i.e., videos) and static (i.e.,
pictures) facial expressions. Control conditions revealed that it
disappeared when faces were presented upside-down, ruling out
an interpretation in terms of low-level stimulus differences.
The purposes of the present studywere twofold. First,we aimed
at characterizing inmore detail the processing of facial expressions
during crowding. Extending our previous results, we show that
both featural crowding (i.e., crowding of local cues like the shape
of the mouth, induced by pattern ﬂankers) and conﬁgural crowd-
ing (i.e., crowding of local cues, but also metric distances between
them, induced by neutral face ﬂankers) preserved the inﬂuence
from facial expressions on preference judgment (Experiment 1).
In addition, replicating our previous study now with a neutral
baseline, we showed that the nonconscious preference bias arose
speciﬁcally from the processing of happy faces, both for static and
dynamic stimuli (Experiment 2), whereas both happy and angry
faces elicited preference biases only when perceived consciously
(Experiment 3).
Second, we performed a systematic comparison of the depth
of facial expressions processing in GCC, visual masking (Experi-
ment 4), and CFS (Experiment 5). Because these different para-
digms prevent perceptual awareness through differentmeans (e.g.,
peripheral stimulation and presence of ﬂankers in GCC, duration
of the prime and presence of the mask in masking, interocular
suppression in CFS), we adapted the experimental parameters of
eachmethod such as to reach the sensory stimulation of maximum
energy, while remaining below the threshold for perceptual aware-
ness. Respecting the limits entailed by each method, we found
qualitatively different results. Indeed, if emotional faces under
visual masking and CFS were able to elicit perceptual priming
(i.e., they inﬂuenced the processing of an identical target face),
we could not ﬁnd evidences that they were processed such as to
bias subsequent preference judgments. The discrepancies between
the different methods are discussed in light of the neural bases of
crowding, masking, and binocular rivalry.
GAZE-CONTINGENT CROWDING
EXPERIMENT 1
Face perception involves at least two different levels of process-
ing: featural processing, which reﬂects the encoding of local cues
(e.g., geometrical shape of the mouth), and conﬁgural processing,
which refers to the encoding of metric distances between features
(Maurer et al., 2002). Depending on the nature of the ﬂankers,
crowding can disrupt either level of processing. When patterns
without conﬁgural information are used as ﬂankers, they inter-
fere with features of the central face, and thus prevent mainly
featural processing (Kouider et al., 2011). On the other hand, in
case faces are used as ﬂankers, interferences with the central face
involve both featural and conﬁgural informations (Louie et al.,
2007; Farzin et al., 2009).
Several studies have shown that conﬁgural information is more
affected by face inversion than the perception of local cues (for
review, see Rossion, 2008). In our previous study dealing with
featural crowding, emotional inverted faces did not induce a
bias in preference judgment, suggesting ﬁrst that the preference
bias we observed had a conﬁgural rather than featural origin,
and second that this conﬁgural processing was preserved despite
featural crowding (Kouider et al., 2011). In Experiment 1, we
tested whether the nonconscious processing of faces was pre-
serveddespite conﬁgural crowding. For this purpose,we compared
how emotional faces surrounded by patterns (inducing featural
crowding) and surrounded by neutral faces (inducing conﬁgural
crowding) biased preference judgment.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Eighteen French college students (age range= 18–
35 years) participated in Experiment 1. All reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their participation.
All asserted that they were unable to read Chinese pictographs.
Stimuli. We recorded facial expressions from ﬁve actresses
recruited from a professional acting academy. Each actress’s face
was ﬁlmed against a black background, in an equally illuminated
room. Faces expressed happiness or anger. Randommouthmotion
was used as a neutral condition. Video clips were slightly sped
up or down to compensate for the differences between the tim-
ings of the different actors’ expressions. The time of emotional
paroxysms during the video clips were deﬁned by two indepen-
dent observers. All video clips were cropped to show the face only.
They were then matched for average luminance (12.7 Cdm−2),
contrast, and image size (3.2˚× 3.9˚). Snapshots were extracted
from each video, at t = 0ms for the neutral expression condition,
and t = 1500ms for the emotional paroxysm condition. Flankers
consisted in 2.5˚× 2.8˚ patterns created by overlaying faces and
objects, resulting in non-informative objects (de Gardelle and
Kouider, 2010). The luminance of the ﬂankers was 40% higher
than that of the emotional faces. Targetswere 3˚ × 3˚whiteChinese
pictographs.
Equipment. Eye movements were recorded monocularly with
a tower mounted eye tracker (Eyelink 1000 system, SR research,
ON, Canada) controlled with the Eyelink toolbox (Cornelissen
et al., 2002), with a sampling rate of 1000Hz and a spatial resolu-
tion of 1˚ or above. Stimuli were all displayed using Matlab with
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) against a
black background on a 22-in. IiyamaVision master pro 510 screen
(frame rate of 85Hz, resolution of 1024× 768 pixels, luminance
of 0.004Cdm−2). The participants sat 57 cm from the screen in a
dimly lit room. A chin and headrest was used in all experiments.
A calibration phase was performed after each block of 90 trials.
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Procedure. Experiment 1 included 240 preference judgment tri-
als and 120 visibility trials, equally divided to 4 blocks of 90 trials.
In each block, the ﬂankers surrounding the emotional face were
displayed in a circular array of either six faces identical to the emo-
tional face but with a neutral expression (f), or in a circular array
of six ﬂanker patterns (m). The order of blocks was counterbal-
anced so that half the subjects went through the (f) block ﬁrst
(i.e., f-m-f-m) and the other half through the (m) block ﬁrst (i.e.,
m-f-m-f).
Each trial started with a 0.5˚× 0.5˚ ﬁxation cross that was pre-
sented for 300ms. The emotional face was then displayed for
2500ms, surrounded by the six ﬂankers (18˚ eccentricity between
the emotional face and ﬁxation cross centered at the quarter top of
the screen; 3.1˚ (center to center distance),or 0.3˚ (edge to edge dis-
tance) between the emotional face and the ﬂankers). Importantly,
as soon as the participant ceased to gaze at the ﬁxation area (5˚
by 5˚ zone surrounding the ﬁxation cross) the emotional face was
substituted by the same face with a neutral expression so to guar-
antee that the emotional face was never processed foveally (see
Figure 1). Then, participants performed one of two tasks (ran-
domly presented); in two thirds of the trials, they were instructed
to decide whether a Chinese pictograph displayed for 150ms at the
ﬁxation location was pleasant (right button press) or unpleasant
(left button press). They were asked not to make an esthetic judg-
ment, but rather follow a spontaneous intuition, and to provide an
answer in less than a second. In the other third of trials, a question
concerning the facial expression appeared at the ﬁxation location
instead of the Chinese pictograph, stating either “Happiness?” or
“Anger?”. Participants answered “yes” by pressing the right but-
ton, or “no”by pressing the left button. The question remained on
screen until a response was provided1.
1It is of note that this discrimination measure offers two main advantages. First,
the use of a meta-cognitive discrimination task (Kouider et al., 2011; Faivre and
Kouider, 2011b) in which a probe question about the stimulus is presented prevents
potential inﬂuences of the crowded stimulus on the objective visibilitymeasure itself
(Cheesman and Merikle, 1986). Indeed, while meta-cognitive access is thought to
be speciﬁc to conscious cognition (e.g., Lau and Rosenthal, 2011), more classical
discrimination tasks (e.g., always pressing the right button for happy faces vs. the
left button for angry faces; see Kouider and Dehaene, 2007) may be resolved through
nonconscious stimulus-response mapping, which would lead to an overestimation
of stimulus visibility (Abrams and Greenwald, 2000; Damian, 2001). Here, since
the question is chosen randomly on each trial, a meta-cognitive access to the facial
expression is necessary in order to perform a correct answer (e.g., in case a happy
face was presented, being able to answer “yes” to the question “Happiness ?” or “no”
to the question “Anger ?”). In addition, because the upcoming task (i.e., preference
judgment or visibility task) is determined randomly on each trial, it allows measur-
ing visibility on-line, in alternation with the preference bias. The visibility measure
is then sensitive to potential changes in perceptual thresholds occurring during the
experiment (e.g., training or fatigue effects). Furthermore, as participants cannot
predict which task theywill encounter, theymust attend to the peripheral face as well
for the two tasks. This attentional ampliﬁcation has even been shown to increase
nonconscious effects (Faivre andKouider, 2011a). Overall,we believe that thismeta-
cognitive discrimination task intermixed with preference judgment task, provides a
more accurate estimate of conscious visibility over the whole experiment.
FIGURE 1 | Left panel : schematic description of the GCC procedure
(Experiment 1). Each trial began with the presentation of a ﬁxation cross,
followed by a peripheral emotional face surrounded by ﬂankers. This was
followed by either a Chinese pictograph on which participants had to make an
evaluative judgment (PreferenceTask), or by a question concerning the
emotion expressed by the prime, on which participants had to answer by yes
or no (Visibility Task). Experiment 1: peripheral happy or angry faces were
presented statically for 2500ms, surrounded by ﬂankers that were either
patterns or neutral faces. Experiment 2: peripheral happy, neutral, or angry
faces were presented statically or dynamically for 1200ms, surrounded by
pattern ﬂankers. Experiment 3: happy, neutral, or angry faces were presented
foveally for 75 or 2500ms, surrounded by pattern ﬂankers. Right panel :
schematic description of the gaze-contingent substitution. As long as
participants’ gaze was maintained in a 5˚×5˚ region surrounding the ﬁxation
cross (“correct gaze”), the peripheral emotional face was presented among
the ﬂankers. As soon as participants’ gaze diverged from this region, the
emotional face was replaced by the same face with a neutral expression
(“gaze-contingent substitution”). In Experiment 2, which contained a neutral
baseline condition, the substitution took place with the same face with a
different neutral expression.
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Analyses. Trials for which gaze position was correct during
95% of total facial expression duration were analyzed (represent-
ing 74.23% of total trials). In order to estimate the preference
bias occurring during featural and conﬁgural crowding, we ran
a 2× 2 ANOVA with Participant as a random variable, Valence
(happy vs. angry), and ﬂanker Type (pattern vs. neutral face) as
within-subjects factors and Group [(f-m-f-m) vs. (m-f-m-f)] as a
between-subjects factor. The assumptions for use of ANOVAs and
t -test were met (preference judgment responses followed a normal
distribution (Shapiro–Wilk test,W = 0.98, p> 0.3) and variances
were equal between conditions).
Results
Participants rated the target with a mean pleasant response rate
of 47.45% (SD= 12.02). The 2× 2 ANOVA analysis revealed a
main effect of valence [F(1,17)= 9.64; p< 0.01], reﬂecting the
fact that participants rated the target as pleasant more frequently
after being exposed to a happy compared to an angry face (4.52%,
SD= 6.23). This effect of valence did not interact with ﬂanker type
nor with group (both F < 1; see Figure 2). All other main effects
and interactions did not reach signiﬁcance. Analysis of the facial
expression visibility task revealed that participants performed
at chance-level both when ﬂankers were neutral faces [mean
d ′ =−0.15, t (18)=−0.73, p> 0.4] and patterns [mean d ′ = 0.25,
t (18)= 1.28, p> 0.2]. No signiﬁcant difference between the two
conditions could be found (p = 0.17). In order to control for the
interaction between the preference bias and the discriminability
of facial expressions, we relied on Greenwald’s regression method
(Greenwald et al., 1995). This complementary analysis revealed
both that the amplitude of preference bias did not correlate with
FIGURE 2 | Comparative results of preference judgment in GCC
(Experiment 1). Averaged percentage of pleasant response on the Chinese
pictograph, depending on the emotion expressed by angry (dark gray) or
happy faces (light gray), when surrounded by pattern ﬂankers or neutral
face ﬂankers. Error bars denote one SE.
discriminability (adjusted R2 =−0.05, p> 0.7), and that the pref-
erence bias extrapolated to null visibility was signiﬁcantly above
zero (intercept = 4.4%, p< 0.01), conﬁrming that the effect we
observed was genuinely nonconscious.
In sum, Experiment 1 revealed that crowded peripheral facial
expressions induced a bias in subsequent preference judgments,
both when they were surrounded by patterns (i.e., featural crowd-
ing) and by neutral faces (i.e., conﬁgural crowding). Complement-
ing our previous study (Kouider et al., 2011), this result suggests
that in addition to featural crowding, conﬁgural crowding allows
for nonconscious conﬁgural face processing. However, whether
the distinction between featural and conﬁgural processing is all
or none or only quantitative remains debated (Riesenhuber et al.,
2004; Yovel and Kanwisher, 2004). Thus, the existence of non-
conscious conﬁgural processing should be comforted by other
diagnostic tests, like the face composite effect (Young et al., 1987)
or the face superiority effect (Tanaka and Farah, 1993).
EXPERIMENT 2
In our previous study, we found that static and dynamic facial
expressions biased preference judgments to the same extent
(Kouider et al., 2011). However, when consciously seen, dynamic
facial expressions were found to induce increased emotional
responses, both behaviorally and physiologically (Sato et al., 2004;
Trautmann et al., 2009). The lack of such increased response in our
previous study might have resulted from potential differences in
the amount of emotional information that could be extracted from
static and dynamic stimuli. Indeed,while in the ﬁrst 500ms of pre-
sentation static faces were already at the paroxysm of emotion, the
dynamic faces were still neutral. This resulted in a difference of
roughly 20% on a total of 2500ms of emotional expression, which
might explain the similar response to the two types of stimuli.
To examine this interpretation, in Experiment 2 the duration
of the videos was shortened to 1200ms so that the discrepancy
between the amount of information in static and dynamic stimuli
was reduced to ∼8% (dynamic stimuli starting with a neutral
expression of 100ms, followed by emotional progression until
paroxysm at t = 1000ms, and dynamical maintenance at the peak
level during 100ms). In addition,Experiment 2 included a baseline
condition, consisting in dynamic neutral faces moving the mouth
randomly, or static neutral faces extracted from these videos (see
Materials and Methods). This was done in order to assess which
emotion (i.e., happiness or anger, expressed statically or dynam-
ically) was able to modulate preference judgments. Finally, this
experiment was conducted within rather than between-subjects,
in order to exclude the possibility that the equivalent bias induced
by static and dynamic stimuli stemmed from group differences
(i.e., in our previous study, groups of participants exposed to static
and dynamic stimuli had different mean pleasant response rates).
Materials and Methods
Participants. Thirteen French college students (age range= 18–
35 years) participated in Experiment 2. All reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their participation.
All asserted that they were unable to read Chinese pictographs.
Stimuli. Stimuli were similar to the ones used in Experiment 1.
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Procedure. Experiment 2 consisted of 360 priming trials and 120
visibility trials, equally divided to 4 blocks of 120 trials. The pro-
cedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1, except for the
following changes: ﬁrst, only patterns were used as ﬂankers. Sec-
ond, each block contained either dynamic (d) or static (s) stimuli,
which were happy, angry, or neutral faces, presented for 1200ms.
Two counterbalanced groups of participants were deﬁned depend-
ing on the sequence of blocks they were assigned to [i.e., either
(d-s-d-s) or (s-d-s-d)]. Third, in the visibility task participants
had to answer one of these three questions regarding the emotional
face: “Happiness?”, “Neutral?”, or “Anger?”.
Analyses. Trials for which gaze position was correct during 95%
of total facial expression duration were analyzed (representing
91.18% of total trials). Modulation of the pleasant response rate
was analyzed in a 3× 2ANOVA,with Participant as a randomvari-
able, valence (happy, neutral, angry), stimulus Type (dynamic vs.
static) as within-subject factors, and Group [i.e., (d-s-d-s) vs. (s-d-
s-d)] as a between-subject factor.A Shapiro–Wilk test assessed that
preference judgment responses followed a normal distribution
(W = 0.97, p> 0.05). Variances were equal between conditions.
Results
The 3× 2 ANOVA analysis revealed a main effect of valence
[F(1,12)= 5.00; p< 0.05], but no interaction with stimulus type
nor group (both F < 1). All other main effects and interactions
did not reach signiﬁcance. We then performed follow-up t -tests
to differentiate the impact of happy and angry faces. We found
that participants rated the Chinese pictographs as more pleasant
when they were previously exposed to crowded happy faces com-
pared with neutral faces [3.7%; t (12)= 2.51; SD= 5.2, p< 0.05].
No overall modulation was observed for angry faces [−1.1%;
t (12)=−0.50; SD= 7.96, p> 0.6; see Figure 3].
Analysis of the facial expression visibility task revealed chance-
level performance [mean d ′ = 0.13; t (12)= 0.77; SD= 0.64,
p> 0.4], with no signiﬁcant differences as a function of
valence [F(1,12)= 1.46,p> 0.2] or stimulus type [F(1,12)= 0.78,
p> 0.3]. The linear regression between the preference bias and the
discriminability of facial expressions conﬁrmed that the preference
bias extrapolated to null visibility was signiﬁcantly above zero in
the case of happy expressions (intercept = 3.9%, p< 0.05) but not
angry expressions (intercept =−0.9%, p> 0.7). The amplitude of
preference bias did not correlate with discriminability in the case
of happy expressions (adjusted R2 =−0.06, p> 0.6), nor angry
expressions (adjusted R2 =−0.07, p> 0.6).
In sum, Experiment 2 revealed that the nonconscious origin
of the preference bias that we obtained previously stems primar-
ily from the processing of facial expressions conveying positive
emotions. Their static or dynamic nature did not modulate signif-
icantly the preference bias amplitude. We come back to this issue
in the discussion.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 aimed at testing whether the restriction to posi-
tive biases found in Experiment 2 was speciﬁc to nonconscious
perceptual processes. We replicated Experiment 2 in condition of
full visibility, using static emotional faces presented foveally. Faces
FIGURE 3 | Comparative results of preference judgment in GCC
(Experiment 2). Averaged percentage of pleasant response on the Chinese
pictograph, depending on the emotion expressed by angry (dark gray),
neutral (gray), or happy faces (light gray). Error bars denote 1 SE. *Denotes
a p-value<0.05.
were presented either for a long duration (2500ms), or for a short
duration (75ms), in order to control for the existence of explicit
strategies when participants were exposed to long-lasting visible
faces (e.g., intentional inhibition of emotional inﬂuences).We rea-
soned that such a short duration will not allow subjects to develop
these strategies especially since they were required to provide a
preference judgment in less than a second.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Twenty-one French college students (age
range= 18–35 years) participated in Experiment 3. All reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid for their
participation. All asserted that they were unable to read Chinese
pictographs.
Stimuli. Same stimuli were used as in Experiment 1 and 2.
Procedure. Experiment 3 included 120 priming trials and 60 vis-
ibility trials, equally divided to 3 blocks of 60 trials. The procedure
was similar to the one used in Experiment 2, except for the follow-
ing changes: First, all stimuli were presented at ﬁxation position, so
to enable foveal perception. Second, emotional faces were all static
and they were randomly presented either for a short duration (i.e.,
75ms) or for a long duration (i.e., 2500ms) within a block.
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Analyses. Results were analyzed with a 3× 2 ANOVA, with Par-
ticipant as a random variable,Valence (happy, neutral, angry) and
stimulus Duration (short vs. long) as within-subject factors. A
Shapiro–Wilk test assessed that preference judgment responses fol-
lowed a normal distribution (W = 0.98, p> 0.4). Variances were
equal between conditions.
Results
Participants rated the target with a mean pleasant response rate
of 59.79% (SD= 14.18). The 3× 2 ANOVA analysis revealed a
main effect of valence [F(1,20)= 17.03; p< 0.001], so that par-
ticipants rated the target as more pleasant after being exposed to
a happy face compared with a neutral one [10.07%; t (20)= 2.78;
SD= 16.61; p< 0.05], and as less pleasant after being exposed
to an angry face [−7.71%; t (20)=−2.65; SD= 13.34; p< 0.05]
(Figure 4). We found no interaction of valence with stimulus
duration [F(1,20)= 0.18; p> 0.6], suggesting that the inﬂuence
of the short-lasting and long-lasting facial expressions were simi-
lar. This makes the potential involvement of explicit strategies less
plausible. All other main effects and interactions did not reach
signiﬁcance.
Analysis of the visibility task revealed a main effect
of stimulus valence [F(1,20)= 24.10; p< 0.001], showing
FIGURE 4 | Comparative results of conscious preference judgment bias
(Experiment 3). Averaged percentage of pleasant response on the Chinese
pictograph, depending on the emotion expressed by angry (dark gray),
neutral (gray), or happy faces (light gray). Short stimulus duration and long
stimulus duration conditions are averaged. Error bars denote 1 SE.
*Denotes a p-value<0.05.
that participants discriminated more accurately happy faces
(mean accuracy = 92.86%) compared to angry faces (mean
accuracy= 80.24%) and to neutral expressions (mean accu-
racy= 66.91%).Therewere signiﬁcant discriminability differences
between happy and neutral faces [paired t -test, t (20)= 8.18,
p< 0.001], angry and neutral faces [paired t -test, t (20)
= 3.60, p< 0.01], and happy and angry faces [paired t -test,
t (20)= 4.90, p< 0.001]. Visibility was clearly above chance-level
performance for all the three facial expressions (all p< 0.001).
Furthermore, a main effect of stimulus duration [F(1,20)= 16.38;
p< 0.001] revealed a greater accuracy for long-lasting compared to
short-lasting stimuli (i.e., 84.13 vs. 75.87%). In sum,Experiment 3
revealed that when facial expressions are consciously visible, they
can bias preference judgments toward negativity when they repre-
sent anger, and toward positivity when they represent happiness,
this effect occurring regardless of stimulus duration.
COMPARISON WITH VISUAL MASKING
The large majority of research on nonconscious perception has
relied on the use of very brief stimulus durations (i.e., typically less
than 50ms) togetherwith stimulus degradation throughbackward
masking (Breitmeyer and Ög˘men, 2006; Kouider and Dehaene,
2007). For instance, facial expressions presented very brieﬂy and
backward masked have been argued to affect brain regions dealing
with emotional information (Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al.,
1998). Yet, such ﬁndings have proven difﬁcult to replicate when
visibility is stringently controlled (Pessoa, 2005). Here, we relied
on a recent face priming paradigm that carefully controlled for
stimulus visibility yet still demonstrated behavioral, electrophysi-
ological, and hemodynamic responses to invisible stimuli, at least
at the perceptual level (Henson et al., 2008; Kouider et al., 2009).
In Experiment 4a, we adapted this masked face priming method
to the preference judgment task, creating a masking equivalent to
GCC. Experiment 4b was aimed at assessing whether the masked
facial expressions were perceptually processed. There, participants
had to indicate whether a target face was happy or angry, in case
it was preceded by an identical masked face, and in case it was
preceded by a masked face of different identity that expressed the
same emotion.
EXPERIMENT 4
Materials and Methods
Participants. Eighteen French college students (age range= 18–
35 years) participated in Experiment 4a, and 10 in Experiment 4b.
All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were paid
for their participation. All asserted that they were unable to read
Chinese pictographs.
Stimuli. Emotional faces were the same static pictures of happy
or angry expressions used in Experiment 1. In order to produce a
robustmasking effect, faces luminancewas 7.8 Cdm−2, 40% lower
than for the masks, and peripheral facial attributes (e.g., hair, ears)
were cropped (ﬁnal size of both faces and masks was 3.2˚× 3.9˚).
In Experiment 4a, targets were 3˚× 3˚ white Chinese pictographs.
In Experiment 4b, targets were either identical to the masked face,
or different faces expressing the same emotion. Targets were 10%
larger compared to the masked faces, in order to avoid physical
overlap.
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Equipment. Stimuli were displayed on a 17-in. Compaq Trini-
tron P700 monitor with a frame rate of 60Hz and a resolution of
1024× 768 pixels.
Procedure. Experiment 4a included 120 priming trials and 60
visibility trials. Each trial started with a 0.5˚× 0.5˚ ﬁxation cross
presented for 300ms, followed by a forward mask that was pre-
sented for 500ms, an emotional face that appeared for 33ms
and then a backward mask presented for 50ms (see Figure 5).
In the preference task, a Chinese Pictograph appeared centrally
for 150ms, while in the visibility task, a question regarding the
facial expression remained on screen until a response was pro-
vided. Instructions were identical to those used previously in
Experiment 1.
Experiment 4b included 160 priming trials and 60 visibility tri-
als. Each trial started with a 0.5˚× 0.5˚ ﬁxation cross for 300ms.
The masked faces were displayed in the same way as in Experiment
4a. In priming trials, the task was to decide, as quickly as possible,
whether an emotional target face displayed for 200ms at the ﬁxa-
tion location expressed anger or happiness. Participants indicated
their response with their left index ﬁnger if they thought the face
was angry or right index ﬁnger if they thought it was happy. They
were instructed to answer as fast as possible. In visibility trials the
question concerning the masked face (“Happiness?” or “Anger?”)
appeared at the ﬁxation location instead of the target face. Par-
ticipants answered “yes” by pressing the right button or “no” by
pressing the left button. The occurrence of a visibility task was
chosen randomly.
Analyses. A Shapiro–Wilk test assessed that preference judgment
responses followed a normal distribution (W = 0.98, p> 0.1).
Variances were equal between conditions.
Results
In Experiment 4a, we failed to observe a signiﬁcant preference bias
of happy compared to angry masked faces [2.5%; t (18)= 1.22;
SD= 9.12; p> 0.2; see Table 1]. Importantly however, the rep-
etition priming experiment (Experiment 4b) that focused on
perceptual processing of the emotional faces, revealed a signiﬁ-
cant effect of priming [8ms; t (10)= 2.15; p< 0.05; see Table 2].
In both experiments, the visibility task conﬁrmed that backward
masking prevented conscious access to the facial expressions,
as performance was at chance for both Experiment 4a (mean
d ′ =−0.05; t (18)=−0.67; SD= 0.3, p> 0.5) and Experiment 4b
(mean d ′ = 0.11; t (10)= 0.32; SD= 1.15, p> 0.7).
Performing a linear regression between the preference bias and
the discriminability of facial expressions did not reveal a signif-
icant correlation (adjusted R2 = 0.02, p> 0.2). Furthermore, the
preference bias extrapolated to null visibility was non-signiﬁcantly
different from zero (intercept = 2.9%, p = 0.18). In sum, the
absence of effect in Experiment 4a suggest that the masking pro-
cedure we employed does not allow the emotional contents from
Forward Mask
FIGURE 5 | Schematic description of the masking procedure
(Experiment 4a). Each trial began with the presentation of a ﬁxation
cross, followed immediately by a forward mask pattern, and then by the
emotional face accompanied by the backward mask pattern. This was
followed by a Chinese pictograph (PreferenceTask), or a question
concerning the emotion expressed by the face (Visibility Task).
Experiment 4b employed the same procedure, except that the
preference task was replaced by a perceptual priming task, in which the
target was a face which was either identical or expressing the same
emotion as the masked face.
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Table 1 | Comparative results of preference judgment in masking and
CFS.
Stimulus type Prime valence
Anger Happiness
M SD M SD
VISUAL MASKING
Observed response (%) 56.7 12.4 59.2 12.2
CFS STATIC
Observed response (%) 57.9 17.0 58.5 14.4
CFS Dynamic
Observed response (%) 56.5 14.0 55.5 14.5
Averaged percentage of pleasant response rate to the neutral target (Chinese
pictograph), depending on the emotion expressed by the face (i.e., happiness or
anger). SD denotes standard deviation. Results are shown for masking (Experi-
ment 4a), CFS with static faces (Experiment 5a), and CFS with dynamic faces
(Experiment 5c).
Table 2 | Perceptual priming results in masking and CFS.
Trial type Relation
Related Unrelated
M SD M SD
VISUAL MASKING
Observed RT (ms) 414.0 63.7 422.7 62.1
CFS STATIC
Observed RT (ms) 550.5 102.6 566.4 101.6
Averaged reaction times for the emotional target face, for related, and unrelated
trials. Results are shown for Experiment 4b (masking) and Experiment 5b (CFS).
SD denotes standard deviation.
biasing preference judgments. Yet, perceptual priming effects in
Experiment 4b show that masking still allows for the extraction
of perceptual information. We come back to this issue in the
discussion.
COMPARISON WITH CONTINUOUS FLASH SUPPRESSION
Another alternative for rendering stimuli invisible that has recently
attracted attention is CFS (Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). This tech-
nique, which is an extension of binocular rivalry, consists in
presenting a dynamic stream of contour-rich, high-contrast pat-
terns to one eye, in order to suppress the stimulus presented to the
other eye from awareness. As in GCC, this method allows for long
stimulus presentations, thus potentially increasing the strength of
invisible signals. However, in CFS, the largest suppression appears
to occur relatively early in the visual system (i.e., in sub-cortical
and striate areas), andmight thus reduce signal processing in visual
ventral areas dealing with object and face recognition (see Lin
and He, 2009, for a review). Here, we tested whether static facial
expressions manipulated by CFS could bias preference judgments
(Experiment 5a) and elicit repetition priming (Experiment 5b).
In Experiment 5c, we extended the measure of biasing preference
judgment to dynamic facial expressions.
EXPERIMENT 5
Materials and Methods
Participants. Fifteen French college students (age range= 18–
35 years) participated in Experiment 5a, 9 in Experiment 5b, and
12 in Experiment 5c. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and were paid for their participation. All asserted that they
were unable to read Chinese pictographs.
Stimuli. Static stimuli in Experiment 5a and 5b were the same as
those used in the static condition of Experiment 1. Dynamic stim-
uli in Experiment 5c were the same as those used in the dynamic
condition of Experiment 2.
Equipment. Observers viewed the display through an adjustable
mirror stereoscope (ScreenScope Mirror Stereoscope) on a 17′′.
Compaq Trinitron P700 monitor with a frame rate of 60Hz and a
resolution of 1024× 768 pixels.
Procedure. A 8.7× 6.7˚ frame, composed of textured black and
white bars (0.7˚ width) was presented in each eye to facilitate sta-
ble convergence of the two images. Mondrian patterns consisted
of arrays of randomly generated shapes of different color and form
(i.e., changing every 125ms, 8Hz), surrounded by a squared bor-
der corresponding to the area of stimuli presentation (8˚ × 6˚).
They were presented to left or right eye (“non-suppressed eye,”
randomly chosen at each trial). Emotional faces were displayed
for 2500ms, either statically (Experiments 5a and b) or dynami-
cally (Experiment 5c; see Figure 6). In order to keep the suppressed
faces invisible, their luminance was decreased by a factor of 70%
compared to the targets. Targets were 10% larger compared to the
suppressed faces, in order to avoid physical overlap.
Preference bias experiments (Experiments 5a and c) included
120 priming trials and 60 visibility trials, randomly intermixed.
The preference valence task and the visibility task were the same
as those used previously in Experiment 1.
The perceptual priming experiment (Experiment 5b) included
160 priming trials and 60 visibility trials, randomly intermixed.
Targets were either identical to the suppressed emotional face, or
consisted of different faces expressing the same emotion. The per-
ceptual priming task and the visibility task were the same as those
previously used in Experiment 4b. In each trial, both target and
suppressed faces were always presented to the same eye.
Analyses. A Shapiro–Wilk test assessed that preference judg-
ment responses followed a normal distribution in Experiment 5a
(W = 0.96, p> 0.05) and 5c (W = 0.96, p> 0.05). Variances were
equal between conditions.
Results
In Experiment 5a, no signiﬁcant preference bias from facial
expressions was found [0.6%; t (14)= 0.24; SD= 9.14; p> 0.8; see
Table 1]. However, in the repetition priming experiment (5b) a
signiﬁcant effect of repetition priming revealed that subjects iden-
tiﬁed the emotional expression of the target slower when primed
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FIGURE 6 | Schematic description of the CFS procedure (Experiment
5a). Each trial began with the presentation of a ﬁxation cross, followed by
a dynamic stream of alternating patterns (Mondrian) presented to one eye,
while a static emotional face was presented to the other (suppressed eye).
When the Mondrian stream stopped, either a Chinese pictograph
(PreferenceTask) or a question concerning the emotion expressed by the
face (Visibility Task) was presented to the suppressed eye. In Experiment
5b, except that the preference task was replaced by a perceptual priming
task, in which the target was either an identical face expressing the same
emotion as the suppressed face or a different face expressing the same
emotion. Experiment 5c was identical to Experiment 5a, yet with
dynamic faces.
with an identical emotional face [−18ms; t (8)=−2.56, p< 0.05;
see Table 2]. This is congruent with previous reports by our group
of longer reaction times following prolonged stimulus exposure
in either CFS (Barbot and Kouider, 2011) or crowding (Faivre and
Kouider, 2011b). Indeed, we recently found that while short stim-
ulus exposures (e.g., 200ms), lead to positive repetition priming,
longer exposures (e.g., 1000ms) actually induce negative prim-
ing. This inversion of priming effects might be related to the
fact that visual stimulation in the absence of perceptual aware-
ness does not allow for a sustained representation of the encoded
features and result in sensory habituation (see Faivre and Kouider,
2011b).
Stimulus visibility was not signiﬁcantly better than chance,
in both Experiment 5a [mean d ′ = 0.15; t (14)= 1.98; SD= 0.29,
p< 0.1] and Experiment 5b [mean d ′ = 0.09; t (8)= 1.35;
SD= 0.20, p> 0.2]. However, there was a marginal trend for
visibility in Experiment 5a, which could indicate that some partic-
ipants might have been aware of the facial expressions. In order to
address this possibility,we relied oncemore onGreenwald’s regres-
sion method (Greenwald et al., 1995), which revealed that the
preference bias extrapolated to null discriminability did not dif-
fer from zero (intercept = 0.9%, p> 0.7), and that the preference
bias was not modulated by discriminability (adjusted R2 =−0.07,
p> 0.7).
Finally, in Experiment 5c, we tested whether dynamic stim-
uli under CFS could bias preference judgments. No signiﬁcant
preference bias was found [−1.1%; t (11)=−0.5; SD= 8.82;
p> 0.6],with chance-level performance in the visibility task (mean
d′ = 0.19; SD= 0.48, p> 0.1). The linear regression between
the preference bias and the discriminability of facial expres-
sions revealed that the intercept did not differ signiﬁcantly from
zero (intercept =−1.5%, p> 0.5), and that the preference bias
was not modulated by discriminability (adjusted R2 =−0.07,
p> 0.6).
In sum, our results reveal that, as with masking, perceptual
information from suppressed stimuli in CFS is extracted up to
the point of inducing perceptual priming. As we did not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant effect, we can not conclude that processing of static
and dynamic facial expressions under CFS is deep enough to bias
subjects’ subsequent preference judgments.
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DISCUSSION
FACE PERCEPTION UNDER VISUAL CROWDING
In a series of eight experiments, we characterized face process-
ing outside perceptual awareness using three different techniques:
GCC, visual masking, and CFS. In addition to providing fur-
ther evidence regarding the nonconscious processing of emo-
tional faces (see Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010, for a review), this
comparative approach provide grounds for better understand-
ing of the different suppression mechanisms, hereby allowing a
more founded interpretations of ﬁndings regarding the depth of
nonconscious processing.
First, we showed with GCC that peripheral stimuli conveying
emotions (i.e., happy compared to angry faces) could bias sub-
sequent preference judgments, both when featural and conﬁgural
information processing was impeded by crowding2. In a second
2It could be argued that the preference bias arises from a change in the appearance
of the ﬂankers due to the ﬂanked facial expression. If it was the case, participants
would probably be able to discriminate this change, as crowding is less important
for the ﬂankers than for the central stimulus. As we showed that participants did
not perform above chance-level during the visibility task, this makes this hypothesis
unlikely. Yet, if the appearance of ﬂankers changed but remained unnoticed due
experiment which included a neutral baseline, we showed that this
approach could be applied to dynamic stimuli (videos) as well,
and that the preference bias arose speciﬁcally from faces express-
ing happiness. This restriction to positive preference bias was not
observed in Experiment 3, in which facial expressions were pre-
sented foveally and were thus consciously visible. The existence
of an inﬂuence from angry faces during foveal but not peripheral
vision was conﬁrmed by post hoc analyses, which revealed a signif-
icant difference in negative preference bias between Experiment 2
and 3 [Welch’s t -test, t (31.99)= 1.81, p< 0.05]. The difference in
positive preference bias between Experiment 2 and 3 did not reach
signiﬁcance (p> 0.1; see Figure 7).
Possibly, under visual crowding the lower signal from angry
faces was not sufﬁcient to bias preference judgments. This is cor-
roboratedbyprevious results showing that peripheral presentation
of faces was found to globally impair expression recognition,
except for happy expressions (Goren and Wilson, 2006). This
apparent advantage for happy faces might be related to the fact
to crowding, this would reﬂect a nonconscious inﬂuence from the ﬂanked facial
expression, which is compatible with our claim.
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FIGURE 7 | Comparative results of preference judgment bias
(Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4a, and 5a,c). Averaged percentage of preference bias
from the comparison of angry vs. neutral faces (dark gray, Experiments 2 and
3), happy vs. neutral faces (light gray, Experiments 2 and 3), and happy vs.
angry faces (white, Experiments 1, 4a, and 5a,c). GCC stands for
gaze-contingent crowding. CFS stands for continuous ﬂash suppression.
Horizontal bars denote interactions between negative preference bias in
Experiment 2 and 3, and interactions between positive preference bias in
Experiments 1, 2, and 4a, 5a,c (see meta-analyses in the discussion). Error
bars denote 1 SE. *Denotes a p-value<0.05, **p-value<0.01.
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that thediagnostic features for the recognitionof happiness involve
mouth in the low spatial frequency spectrum,while the recognition
of anger is rather driven by the eyes (i.e., frown) through higher
spatial frequencies (Smith and Schyns, 2009). This is further sup-
ported by the higher recognition rate of happiness compared to
anger during foveal viewing (see Experiment 3). However, this
advantage might have also resulted from the higher similarity
between the negative expressions and the neutral ones, compared
with the positive expressions. Such similarity in our stimuli might
have led to anunderestimationof preference biaswhen contrasting
neutral and angry expressions.
Our ﬁndings shed new light on the phenomenon of crowd-
ing itself, whose origins remain highly controversial (Levi, 2008).
Crowding occurs when an object and its ﬂankers are integrated
in the same integration ﬁeld, resulting in a jumbled percept in
which the object cannot be discriminated. It has been shown that
the size of the integration ﬁeld increases with eccentricity in the
visual ﬁeld, following an empirical psychophysical law (Bouma
law, Bouma, 1970). However, the reason for this widening remains
highly debated. According to bottom-up proposals, integration
ﬁelds are materialized in the primary visual cortex (Pelli, 2008),
which consequently implies a loss of information for crowded
stimuli at and beyond V1. Our results tend to argue against this
view, and rather suggest that the information from crowded stim-
uli is still present in the visual system, but remains inaccessible
to conscious awareness (thus being able to inﬂuence later pref-
erence judgments). From this perspective, crowded perception
would only reﬂect a partial conscious read-out of information,
while further processing occurs in a nonconscious manner.
Consistent with a belated occurrence of crowding along the
visual pathways, several studies have shown that single-feature
crowded stimuli (e.g., line orientation, see He et al., 1996;
Montaser-Kouhsari and Rajimehr, 2005; Faivre and Kouider,
2011b) and multifeature crowded objects (e.g., faces or directional
arrows, see Faivre and Kouider, 2011a) are processed despite the
fact that they remain consciously undiscriminable. In other words,
during featural crowding, a feature is nevertheless processed
despite featural interactions with the ﬂankers. Finally, this study
shows that such processing can also occur despite conﬁgural
crowding, when face ﬂankers interfere with conﬁgural process-
ing. This ﬁnding extends our previous study in which no bias
of preference judgments was found for inverted as opposed to
up-right faces, suggesting that the bias stems from the faces’ con-
ﬁgural information. Here, our results suggest that crowding allows
for a nonconscious conﬁgural face processing despite conﬁgural
interactions with the ﬂankers. Clearly, other pieces of evidence for
the conﬁgural processing of crowded faces will be necessary, like
the face superiority effect (Tanaka and Farah, 1993), or the face
composite effect (Young et al., 1987).
In Experiment 2, we found that GCC could be used to demon-
strate the inﬂuence of static (i.e., pictures) and dynamic (i.e.,
videos) happy faces on subsequent preference judgment. Notably,
the amplitude of preference bias was not signiﬁcantly different
between the two types of stimuli. This seems to contradict the ﬁnd-
ings that dynamic facial expressions are better recognized during
conscious processing than static ones. Surely, it remains possible
that the behavioralmeasurewe employedwas not sensitive enough
to detect a differential effect. Nevertheless, these results might also
imply that nonconscious processing does not allow the temporal
binding of dynamic stimuli into uniﬁed perceptual representation.
In that respect, GCC seems to offer good means for the study of
nonconscious temporal integration, a fundamental property that
has far not been investigated so far.
COMPARING DIFFERENT METHODS FOR PREVENTING PERCEPTUAL
AWARENESS
Our study provides unique insights regarding the level of process-
ing of facial expressionunder three different techniques preventing
perceptual awareness.While GCC allows for the processing under-
lying a bias in subsequent preference judgments, only lower-level
repetition priming effects were found under visual masking and
CFS. Post hoc analyses conﬁrmed this ﬁnding, by showing a sig-
niﬁcant difference regarding the preference bias from happy faces
under GCC (i.e., difference in preference judgment after expo-
sition to happy vs. angry faces in Experiments 1 and 2) and
masking/CFS [i.e., difference in preference judgment after exposi-
tion to happy vs. angry faces in Experiments 4a, 5a, and 5c; 6.10
vs. 0.96%, Welch’s t -test, t (55.73)= 2.20, p< 0.05; see Figure 7].
Separate analyses revealed a signiﬁcant difference between GCC
(Experiments 1 and 2) and CFS [Experiments 5a,c; Welch’s t -test,
t (50.21)= 2.41, p< 0.05], but not between GCC (Experiments 1
and 2) and masking (Experiment 4; p> 0.3).
The absence of signiﬁcant preference bias with masking might
arise from a lack of statistical power (19 participants, bias= 2.5%,
SD= 9.12, resulting in a power d = 0.21; see Cohen, 1988). On the
other hand, the drastic degradation required in order to prevent
perceptual awareness might dramatically reduce stimulus strength
and notably the reentrant activity associated with higher-level
visual processes, so that the masked stimulus might not reach
the level of processing necessary for biasing preference judgments
(Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000). The results we found in Exper-
iment 4a and 4b are consistent with previous rigorous analyses
(Pessoa, 2005), and question the existence of inﬂuences from
emotional faces beyond perceptual levels.
Regarding CFS, the lack of signiﬁcant preference bias is in line
with theories of binocular rivalry that hold drastic suppression to
occur early along the visual pathways (i.e., in sub-cortical and stri-
ate areas), hereby impeding processing in higher visual regions of
the ventral stream (Fang and He, 2005; Jiang and He, 2006). Along
the same lines, categorically congruent stimuli suppressed using
CFS were found to facilitate the categorization of tools (assumed
to be processed in the dorsal visual pathway), yet not that of non-
manipulable objects that are assumed to be processed in the ventral
visual pathway (Almeida et al., 2008). We should mention, on the
other hand, evidences for high-level processes during CFS in case
of faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2010) or complex visual
scenes (Mudrik et al., 2011).
Drawing conclusions from the results obtained with mask-
ing or CFS as taken separately, one might be prone to infer that
nonconscious processing of facial expressions is essentially limited
to perceptual rather than higher emotional levels. Yet, our results
with GCC argue otherwise, since the biasing of subsequent pref-
erence judgment induced by crowded stimuli demonstrates that
high-level processing is possible despite perceptual unawareness.
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This suggests that the absence of signiﬁcant results with masking
and CFS do not reﬂect a theoretical limitation of nonconscious
cognition, but rather a methodological one. In this respect, the
set of data we report provides a good example of the importance
of methodological comparisons in the context of a contrastive
study of consciousness. It also highlights the need for a rigorous
methodological inquiry of the mechanisms underlying the dif-
ferent methods of rendering stimuli invisible, and for a cautious
interpretation of results when relying on single methods.
One interesting feature of crowding compared to masking and
interocular suppression is its ecological relevance. Indeed, out-
side a laboratory, one rarely faces a stimulus for a few tens of
milliseconds, immediately followed by another backward mask-
ing stimulus sharing some physical properties (i.e., same position,
size, spatial frequency spectrum). Similarly, one rarely receives a
stimulus in one eye, while the other eye is bombarded with rapidly
changing ﬂashes. By contrast, crowding is ubiquitous in spatial
vision (e.g., while reading, walking among a crowd), and periph-
eral stimuli are of indubitable relevance as we evolve in cluttered
environments. For obvious reasons, it remains necessary to adapt
crowding to a well-controlled environment (e.g., in GCC, substi-
tuting the stimulus as soon as the observer’s gaze diverges from a
deﬁned location). Nevertheless, relying on a perceptual modality
which occurs during natural vision may not be trivial to uncover
the depth of nonconscious cognition. The present demonstra-
tion of high-level nonconscious effects which are unique for the
GCC technique, makes it a valuable alternative for the study of
the depth of nonconscious processing. While crowding is con-
sidered as a bottleneck to object recognition (Whitney and Levi,
2011), the amount of environmental information that can be con-
sciously accessed is thus reduced, while informational encoding is
maintained to a degree that sufﬁces to inﬂuence subjects’ behavior.
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